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This article develops a two-factor  model of  bank behavior under credit and interest rate risk.  In 
addition to flat-rate government deposit guarantees, we assume banks possess charter values that are 
lost if audits reveal  that their tangible assets cannot cover their liabilities.  Within this framework, 
we investigate the effects of interest rate and credit risk on optimal capital structure and investment 
decisions.  We then show that with no uncertainty in interest rates, capital regulation will reduce 
the risk of the assets in the bank. However, with interest rate uncertainty, the impact of  regulation 
may be detrimental and raise the risk of  the deposits as well  as the government subsidies to the 
shareholders of  the bank. 
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Most models of  deposit insurance assume that the volatility of  a bank's  asset prices is exogenously 
provided  and derives from a single source.  In this framework, the relative merits of  the firm in- 
creasing volatility can be easily explored.'  This approach, however, does not provide a rich enough 
structure for equityholders to compare alternative capital structures and investment policies under 
a fixed-rate deposit insurance regime.  In this study, we  extend the analysis of  Merton  [I9771 and 
Marcus  [I9841 by  allowing for two sources of  asset risk:  credit risk, which  arises from economic 
uncertainty; and interest rate risk, which emanates from a duration mismatch between the bank's 
assets and liabilities.  We also assume that a bank possesses a valuable growth option embodied in 
its charter.  The presence of  a charter and multiple sources of  uncertainty provides a rich enough 
framework for examining  the consequences  of  alternative capital structure and investment  deci- 
sions of  the bank.  Our objective is to explore the bank's  investment  and financing strategies that 
maximize shareholder interests in a model that incorporates both government-subsidized  deposit 
insurance, the charter, and regulatory constraints. 
In our model, banks have incentives to increase the value of  fixed rate deposit insurance by 
maximizing risk.  Extreme risk  taking,  however,  may  not  be optimal  because  it increases  the 
likelihood of  regulatory interference  and charter-related bankruptcy costs.  To reduce the moral 
hazard  problem associated  with  deposit insurance, we follow Buser, Chen, and Kane [I9811 and 
assume the deposit insurer has two tools at its disposal to limit the value of  its insurance. The first 
is through charter regulation. By limiting the supply of  charters and by implementing regulations 
intended to limit competition in banking markets, the government seeks to increase charter values 
and hence reduce the risk-taking incentives provided by  deposit insurance.  The second is through 
capital regulation.  Under interest  rate certainty, capital  regulation  as embodied in the current 
risk-based  capital standards and  charter regulation  are substitute policies.  That is, the deposit 
insurer can use capital regulation  to offset  declines in charter values.  This result, however, does 
not necessarily obtain under uncertain interest rates. 
Our study is not the first to consider the implications of  interest rate risk on shareholder wealth 
and on the value of deposit insurance.  Similar analyses have been conducted by McCulloch [1983.] 
and Crouhy and Galai [1991].  McCulloch's  primary objective is to explore the impact of  interest 
rate risk  on the value of  deposit insurance.  Crouhy and Galai's  main focus is to investigate the 
impact of  capital regulation  and bank reserve account regulations  when deposit  rates reflect  the 
risk  of  the asset portfolio.  Neither  study investigates the impact of  interest rate risk on optimal 
investment and financing decisions for insured banks. In contrast, our primary focus is how interest 
rate risk interacts with asset risk  to alter the optimal investment and capital structure decisions, 
and the attendant implications for capital regulation. 
The literature on deposit insurance using  an option pricing framework was pioneered by  Merton [1977].  For  a 
review of the literature, see Flood (1990). 
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financing and investment decisions are predetermined.  Uncertainty is represented by interest rate 
risk and by credit risk in the loan portfolio.  Section I11 investigates the shareholders' optimization 
problem under interest rate certainty.  As in Marcus [I9841 and Ritchken, Thomson, DeGennaro, 
and Li  [1993], the capital structure and investment decisions reflect the tradeoff between maximizing 
the charter value and the deposit insurance subsidy.  Without interest rate uncertainty, extreme 
point  solutions for the investment  solution dominate.  However,  the optimal financing  decision 
may involve the shareholders supplying some capital.  In this case, capital regulation  and charter 
regulation are substitute policies for limiting the value of  deposit insurance.  Section IV rederives 
the optimal investment and capital structure decisions when banks face interest rate risk.  In this 
case, we  show  that the second  source of  risk  allows for diversification  effects, which  may make 
interior investment  decisions  optimal.  Moreover,  with  interest  rate risk  present,  the effects  of 
capital regulation on shareholder behavior can lead to counterproductive results. Indeed, we  show 
that capital regulation can result  in increased risk  taking by  banks, thereby increasing the value 
of deposit insurance rather than reducing it. The implication  of using capital regulation to offset 
declining bank charter values is then explored. Section V concludes the paper. 
11. A Model of an Insured Bank 
We assume that the market for default-free bonds is a competitive one in which banks are price- 
takers.  Banks do have a comparative advantage in evaluating credit risks, however, and therefore 
can invest in positive net present value loans. We assume owners of the bank are also its managers. 
At date 0 they fund the asset portfolio with a dollars of equity and D(0) = 1  -a dollars of  deposits 
fully insured by a government agency. The agency charges the bank a flat-rate premium per dollar 
of deposits.  The net present value of  deposit insurance at time 0,  denoted by G(O), can be viewed 
as government- contributed capital. The insurance provides depositors with full protection over the 
time period [O,T], at which  time it is renewed if  the bank is solvent.  The insurer is assumed to 
strictly enforce the closure policy at date T. Specifically, if at date T,  the market value of the assets 
of the bank is below the deposit base, the bank is immediately closed. 
In order to operate, the bank requires a charter.  Charters are valuable because, by rationing 
them, the government grants some degree of  monopoly power to banks in both loan and deposit 
markets.  Keeley  [I9901 argues that this power  allows banks to earn rents in the form of  higher 
risk-adjusted loan rates and lower deposit rates than in competitive markets.  These rents continue 
as long as the bank  remains solvent.  The value  of  the charter is further enhanced because of 
growth options the bank possesses.  These options arise because of  the ability of banks to identify, 
on an ongoing basis, new loans with positive net present value.2  A third source of  charter value 
derives from longstanding customer banking relationships.  Kane and Malkiel [I9651 argue that such 
relationships have value because they lower the information and contracting costs associated with 
These strategic growth options are discussed by Myers [I9771 and Herring and Vankudre [1987]. 
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only to the servicing  bank  and is a source of  future business  opportunities.  Reputation capital, 
as discussed in Diamond  [1989], is a fourth source of  charter value.  In a world where information 
is costly, a high level of  reputation  capital reduces the cost of  external equity and debt capital. 
Finally, as discussed in Kane (1985) and Kane and Unal (1990), bank  charter values incorporate 
the value of  the deposit insurance subsidy in future periods. 
The charter can be viewed as a bundle of  options whose value to equityholders fluctuates with 
the health of  the bank. Let C(0) represent its value at time 0. As the bank's  condition deteriorates, 
the value of  the charter that derives from the growth options as well  as from the long-standing 
customer relationships  is eroded by  increased regulatory taxes and by  funding constraints.  For a 
bank  that fails the audit, the deadweight costs of  bankruptcy  exceed any residual charter value. 
For a bank that passes the audit, its charter value increases with its health, eventually saturating 
at a point that reflects minimal probability of  ongoing default.  Rather than modeling the payoffs 
of  this claim by a complex nonlinear function, we  capture its main attributes by  a step function. 
In particular, we follow Marcus [I9841 and model the value of  this claim at time T by:3 
C(T) =  otherwise. 
Here, V(T) represents the tangible value of  the asset portfolio at date T and D(T) is the level of 
deposits at date T.  The government can induce banks to take on less risk  by  rationing charters 
and enacting regulations designed to limit competition between banks and from nonbank financial 
intermediaries. Through charter regulation, the government increases the size of potential monopoly 
rents that banks can continue  to capture as long  as they remain  solvent.  The parameter g in 
equation (1) represents the size of the monopolistic rents as a percent of  D(T).4 
Dating back  to the work  of  Merton [1977], most  models  of  insured banks do not  explicitly 
incorporate the charter value.  By treating deposits as insured debt, such models lead to shareholder 
interests being best served by extreme portfolio and capital structure decisions.  With the addition 
of  the above charter, incentives are established for shareholders to move away from their extreme 
risk-maximizing  positions. 
Since the charter includes the capitalized value of the spread earned on deposits, without loss of 
The claim on the charter corresponds to that of a digital option. Such options are encountered in over-the-counter 
markets and are characterized by discontinuous payoffs where either a constant or zero is received subject to the 
value of the underlying stochastic variable. 
While  Marcus  argues that  the magnitude  of  the charter value of  a solvent  bank  should be modeled  as some 
fraction,  g, of  the deposit  base,  this assumption  is not essential for  our  analysis.  What  is important is  the 
assumption that bankruptcy costs and charter losses increase in value  as the bank  slides towards bankruptcy. 
For simplicity, we have modeled this as a digital option. 
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where  P(0,T)  is the time 0 value of  a default-free pure discount bond. 
The bank  controls  the capital structure and investment  decision.  Initially the bank  has  1 
dollar available for investment. The bank invests fraction q dollars in a risky loan portfolio and the 
remaining (1 -  q) dollars in Treasury bonds of  maturity s. The date s equals or exceeds the audit 
date, T.'  The risky loan portfolio provides a net present value of  L,,  where 
6(q)  is usually assumed to be non-negative and c~ncave.~  For most of our analysis, we  shall choose 
6(q)  to be independent of  q. 
Let V(0)  represent the initial value of  the loan portfolio.  Then 
The bank's  balance sheet at time zero can be summarized as follows: 






Claim on Future Rents 
Total  1 + G(0)  + C(Q)  + Lq 
Deposits  1-cr 
Shareholder Equity  40) 
Total  1 -  cr + e(0) 
Clearly, if banks were allowed to choose s , they could eliminate interest rate risk by choosing s = T. However, 
since we  are interested in the effects of  interest rate risk on optimal decisions, we restrict s > T.  For many 
financial institutions,  regulation implicitly imposes a similar restriction.  An example of  this is the qualified 
thrift lender test, which requires thrifts to invest 80 percent of their assets in mortgages. 
This functional form reflects the fact that the bank can detect only a limited number of good loans.  For further 
discussion of  the net present value function, see Gennotte and Pyle [1991] and McDonald and Siege1 [1984]. 
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ence comes from the government subsidy, the charter, and the loan portfolio.  Thus 
If  the liquidation value of  the tangible assets, V(T), is greater than or equal to the deposit base 
D(T), the bank is declared solvent.  Otherwise, the bank is declared insolvent.  The terminal claim 
on the charter value, insurance, and equity at the audit date T are 
if  V(T) 2 D(T), 
otherwise. 
if  V(T) 2 D(T), 
otherwise. 
e(T) =  V(T) -  D(T) +  g D(T),  if  V(T) 2 D(T), 
otherwise. 
The value of the tangible assets of the bank at date T will depend on the risk that drives the value 
of the loan portfolio and on the evolution of  interest rates. From equations (6a-c), we  see that these 
claims are complex contracts subject to interest rate and loan uncertainties. 
To model the risk derived from the loan portfolio, we assume the originator of  the loan captures 
the full net present value.  Hence, the resale value of the loan is set to yield a zero net present value. 
Once originated, the dynamics of  each dollar investment in the loan portfolio is given by 
Since  the resale  value  of  the loan is set to yield  a  zero net present  value,  the drift  term, ps, 
corresponds to that of  a traded security of  equivalent risk.  The accrued q dollar investment over 
the time period [O,T] is given by qe6(q)S(~). 
Now  consider interest rate uncertainty.  Let  P(t,s) be the date t  price of  a default-free  pure 
discount bond that pays $1 at date s. Let 
where f (t, x) is the instantaneous forward rate at time t for the time increment [x,x +  dx]. Forward 
rates are assumed to follow a diffusion process of  the form 
with the forward rate function, f(0, .),  initialized to the observed  value.  Here, pf(t,  s), of (t,  S) 
and dw(t) are the drift,  the volatility  structure and  the Wiener  increment,  respectively,  and 
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an exponentially dampened function of  the form 
where a,  r; 2 o.~  In this model pf(t,  .) is chosen so as to avoid riskless arbitrage opportunities from 
arising among bonds of  different maturities. 
The initial investment of  q dollars in risky loans and (1 -  q) dollars worth of  bonds appreciates 
to a value V(T) at date T, where 
The initial values of  the charter, government subsidy, and the equity can be computed once the 
unique  martingale measure under  which  all  securities  are priced  is  identified.  Using  standard 
arbitrage arguments the martingale measure can be readily obtained, and the initial fair values of 
these claims are given by:8 
where 
Given this structure, Heath,  Jarrow  and  Morton show that bond prices at a future date T can be related to 
current bond prices through the relationship 
where 
and 
For  further discussion of this point, see appendices 1 and 2. 
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.z:  =-ln[;] a;  i=1,2. 
The exact formulas for al,  ~2  and p are given in appendix 2. a:  is the variance of  the logarithmic 
returns of  the risky loan over the period [O,T], while a; is the variance of  the logarithmic return 
on the default-free bond  over  the same period.  Finally, p  is the correlation between  these two 
logarithmic returns. 
4j0(z;)  is the probability of  passing the audit under the risk-neutralized probability distribu- 
tion.  For any given investment mix, q, the smaller the shareholder supplied equity, the higher the 
probability that the bank will be declared insolvent. The shareholders'excess,  e(0) -  a,  is affected 
by the value of  the charter, the government subsidy, and the net present value of  the loan portfolio. 
These, in turn, are influenced  by the bank's  capital structure and investment decisions, a and q. 
The value of  the charter depends on shareholder equity, a,  and on the probability of  passing 
the audit. As the equity supplied capital, a,  declines, the threat of  insolvency rises.  This, in turn, 
places the charter at risk and thus imposes costs on equityholders.  By raising the equity supplied 
capital, a, the charter is protected.  However, beyond  some critical point, the benefits resulting 
from a reduction in the probability of insolvency are dominated by the erosion of the charter value 
stemming from a smaller deposit base. 
Now consider the value of the government-subsidized put option, G(0). In competitive markets, 
as the proportion of capital supplied by shareholders declines, bondholders would normally demand 
higher returns to compensate for the reduction in bond quality.  Deposit insurance, however, pro- 
tects the bondholders'capital  and ensures that thebonds are riskless.  Since the bonds are fairly  , 
priced, the cost borne by the government in providing this insurance, G(O), is a benefit that accrues 
to the shareholders.  Further, as the deposit base expands, the incidence of  insolvency rises and the 
value of this subsidy expands. 
From the above discussion, as equityholders contribute more capital, the charter value initially 
rises  while  the government  subsidy  declines.  Ignoring, for  the moment,  the net  present  value 
feature of  the loan portfolio (that is, taking S(q) = 0 ) and assuming a = 0, equityholders will 
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with the optimum a obtaining when dC(O)/da = -dG(O)/da.  In the case where there is no deposit 
insurance, equityholders supply capital up to the point where dC(O)/da = 0.  Clearly, for flat-rate 
deposit insurance dG(O)/da 5 0, and hence for any given investment mix, the optimal amount of 
capital supplied is lowered by the existence of  deposit insurance. This is the classical moral hazard 
problem. 
The values of the government subsidy and the charter are also affected by the investment mix, 
q.  In particular, the investment mix directly affects the probability of  default.  As  the incidence 
of  default  declines, the value of  the charter rises.  At the same time, the value of  the government 
subsidy declines. Maximizing the subsidy involves raising the probability of default and runs counter 
to the objective of maximizing the charter. Nonetheless, the existence of  deposit insurance creates 
incentives to take on additional investment risk. 
The government can induce banks to take on less risk  by  creating additional barriers to en- 
try, thereby raising g.  By tightening the rationing of  charters, the government provides existing 
banks with  the ability to capture larger monopolistic rents, which  continue as long as the banks 
remain solvent. An alternate approach to force banks to reduce their risk is to impose capital-based 
regulatory constraints.  Under these constraints, as the bank's investment in risky loans rises, equi- 
tyholders are required to contribute more capital.  For example, one type of  regulatory constraint 
that is employed is 
where w is the capital weight applied  to risky loans and k  is the minimum capital requirement.g 
By  requiring  that equityholders contribute more capital  than they would  otherwise,  it is to be 
expected that the value of  the government subsidy will be reduced.  In the next  section we  show 
that in  an economy with no  interest  rate risk  this intuition is correct.  However, when  interest 
rates are uncertain,  then the minimum  risk  position  may  involve  a  diversified  portfolio and a 
capital requirement  that falls below the required standards. We show that in some circumstances, 
the optimal equityholders'response is to move to a feasible position that involves creating riskier 
investments. This may raise the value of  the government subsidy and run counter to the intent of 
the regulatory standard. 
111.  Optimal Shareholder Decisions with no Interest Rate Uncertainty 
Let Z(a,  q) represent the shareholder surplus. Then 
In practice, m  is 8 percent and k is 4 percent for U.S. banks. For a description of the new international risk-based 
capital standards, see Avery  and Berger [1991].  For  a derivation of optimal capital weights in a world without 
interest rate risk, see Kim and Santomero [1988]. 
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Equation  (12) clearly illustrates the trade-off faced by shareholders.  Specifically, in selecting the 
optimal capital and investment  decisions,  the shareholders  trade off  the claim  on  the charter, 
government subsidy, and their ability to capture projects with positive net present values.  Let a* 
and q* represent optimal financing and investment decisions.  That is, 
Z(a*,q*) =  Max 
a,qE[O,11 
To focus on the trade-offs between the conflicting objectives of protecting the claim on the charter 
and maximizing  the government  subsidy, we  assume that the benefits of  the loan portfolio are 
independent of  the scale of the investment; that is, 6(q) = 6.  Setting the volatility of interest rates 
to zero results in equations (10a-c) simplifying tolo 
C(0) =  9  (1 -  a)  N(d2),  if 9 > a, 
otherwise. 
G(0) = 
(9 -  a)  N(-4) -  qe6  N(-dl),  if q > a, 
otherwise. 
e(0) =  qe6  N(d1) -  [q -  a -  g (1 -  a)]  N(d2),  if q > a, 
g (1 -  a)  + q (e6 -  1) + a,  otherwise.  (14~) 
where 
For q 2 a, N(d2)  can be viewed as the probability of passing the audit. From equation (14c) 
for q 5 a,  the shareholders'  excess, Z(a,q), increases linearly in the investment mix, q.  For any 
given a, the optimal q value is in  the interval [a,  11.  Now  consider  the behavior of  Z(a,  q) along 
any line  cr = wq  where 0 5 w 5 1 is a constant.  Along this ray  Z(a,q) is a linear function of 
q.  This result implies that the global maximum of  Z(a,q) will  occur at either q = 0 or q = 1, 
and the optimal capital, a*,  and investment, q*, are obtained by solving the following optimization 
problem: 
where 
lo When 6 = 0, these equations (14a-c) reduce to expressions derived by Marcus [I9841 and by Ritchken, Thomson, 
DeGennaro, and Li  [1993]. 
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The investment  policy  is  extreme because,  with  no interest  rate risk,  the benefits  of  portfolio 
diversification are not  available.  Hence,  an extremely  valuable  charter is worth protecting  and 
equityholders  respond  by  investing  the funds in the risk-free  asset.  On  the other hand, if  the 
charter is  not  that valuable,  equityholders will  strive to maximize  the government  subsidy by 
investing all the funds in the risky loan portfolio.  By  controlling the value of  the charter through 
g, the government can influence the optimal investment choice. 
Table 1 illustrates the optimal o and q values for a range of  potential charter values, g. For the 
example below, annual audits were considered (T = I), the annual volatility of  the loan portfolio, 
a,, was set at 10% and all loans were considered to be zero net present value (6 = O).ll 
If the government's regulatory policies produce a high charter value, g, then shareholders will 
take actions to protect  the value of  their claim on the charter (rather than solely maximize the 
value of  the insurance subsidy) by choosing safe rather than risky portfolios.  If, however, market 
forces erode the effectiveness of  charter regulation, then g falls.  The optimal response by banks to 
declining charter values is to increase the value of  the deposit insurance put by bearing more risk. 
In practice, the bank's investment and financing decisions are constrained by regulation.  Buser, 
Chen and Kane  [198:1.] argue that as a  condition for receiving  deposit  insurance, banks subject 
themselves to regulation.  The cost  associated  with regulation  in turn reduces the value  of  the 
government subsidy. Our model permits us to explicitly establish both the cost to the shareholders 
and the benefit  to the regulators of  the regulatory constraint.  Consider, for example, the risk- 
based capital standard introduced earlier in equation (11). The shareholders' objective function in 
equation (13) is now replaced by the following constrained optimization problem 
Z(o;Z, q:)  = Max[Z(o,  q)]  subject to  a 2 Max(wq, k). 
a,q 
The difference between the unconstrained and constrained optimization problems yields the implicit 
cost of regulation to the shareholders. Let AZ  represent this difference. Also let  represent the 
corresponding changes in the probability of  solvency. That is, 
l1 In Table 1, the optimal solutions are extreme because 6 = 0. If  positive net present value projects are available 
then, while q remains extreme, interior solutions for a  may arise. 
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deposit dollar insured, and let A7 be given by 
Aq represents the change in the value of  the government subsidy per dollar insured. 
Proposition 1 
When interest rate  risk  is not present,  risk-based capital standards reduce  the likelihood  of  a bank 
failing  an audit.  Moreover,  the value of  the government subsidy per  dollar insured decreases with 
regulation. 
Pro  of 
The unconstrained optimum mix, q*, is either zero or unity.  First, assume q* = 1. Then, the 
impact of the capital constraint cannot increase risk, and the requirement  that shareholders place 
a minimum amount of  capital will usually result  in decreased risk that lowers the probability of 
failing the audit.I2 Second, consider the alternative value of  q*, namely, q* = 0.  In this case, since 
no risk is borne, the unconstrained optimum equals the constrained optimum, and the probability 
of  closure is unchanged  at zero.  All that remains to be shown is that the government subsidy per 
dollar insured decreases as a increases.  To confirm this, substitute for G(0) from equation  (14b) 
and when q* = 1. This yields 
where 
Now  note that dylda 2 0 and that dq/dy 1. 0.  Hence, dq/da 5 0.  That is, as a increases, the 
government subsidy per deposit dollar decreases. 
l2  Formally, for  g = 1, the probability of closure is N(-dz) and dN(-d;)/da 5 0. 
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the regulatory constraint, leads to a reduction in the size of the wealth transfer from the government. 
From a policy perspective,  tightening capital requirements has the same effect  on risk taking as 
tightening control of  issuing charters to prospective banks. 
IV. Optimal Shareholder Decisions with Interest Rate Uncertainty 
In the presence of interest rate risk, diversification provides an additional risk management option, 
and the optimal unconstrained solution to the shareholders' optimization problem is more likely to 
contain interior solutions than when interest rates were deterministic.  In particular, the minimal 
risk  portfolio may not occur  when  q = 0, but, due to the diversification effect, may  arise at an 
interior point.  Indeed, if  the interest rate and asset risk  exposures are of  a similar magnitude, 
and if  these risks  are uncorrelated, then one would  expect  diversification to be very  important, 
especially if  charter values are high. 
Table 2 shows the behavior of the optimal q* and a*  values to changes in g. For the case param- 
eters selected, investment decisions become riskier ( q*  increases), and incentives for shareholders 
to supply equity capital diminish, as the effects of  charter regulation weaken. 
Figures 1  and 2 show the sensitivity of  optimal decisions to changes in the volatility of interest 
rates and the correlation between interest rates and risky loans. For the case parameters, figure 1 
shows that as the volatility of the bond increases, the optimal response by equityholders is to change 
their investment and capital structure decisions by increasing their investment in risky loans, and 
reducing the probability  of  losing their  charter, by  supplying additional capital.  Of  course, the 
nature of  these results depends on  the magnitude of  the charter, g, and on the size of  the net 
present value factor, 6, and on the magnitude of  the correlation, p. 
Figure 2 illustrates how the correlation can affect optimal decisions.  In the example, as the 
correlation increases, shareholders are prepared to supply more capital.  With perfect  correlation, 
p = 1.0, there is no natural hedge, and to protect  the valuable claim on the charter, shareholders 
supply the most capital. 
As table 2 shows, if the charter value is large relative to the government subsidy, incentives exist 
for the firm to reduce risk.  By diversifying between risky loans and bonds, overall risk is reduced, 
and the likelihood of  retaining the charter is improved.  However, when the bond returns are not 
perfectly negatively  correlated with loan portfolio returns, risk cannot be completely eliminated. 
Hence, to further reduce the probability of  default, the infusion of  additional equity capital may be 
optimal.  To illustrate this point, consider a solvent bank whose charter value is 5 percent of  the 
deposit base.  The volatility of  the loan portfolio, al,  is 5 percent, the volatility of  the long-term 
bond, 02,  is also 5 percent, and the correlation, p, is zero.  The loan portfolio is fairly priced, that 
is, S(q) = 0.  For this problem, the optimal capital is near 7 percent.  This is in contrast to the 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmoptimal capital structure of  a = 0 or  1 that would  have been  obtained if  interest rate risk  were 
ignored. 
The introduction of  interest rate uncertainty into the economy has consequences for the role 
of  regulation  in general and for the capital requirements constraint in particular.  While the con- 
strained  shareholders'  optimization problem  leads  to a wealth loss, this loss  could  indeed  come 
from a loss in the claim on the charter, rather than a loss in the government subsidy.  Indeed, the 
constrained optimal investment and capital structure may be more risky  than the unconstrained 
optimal solutions.  As  a result, this regulatory constraint may  result  in  increasing,  rather than 
decreasing, government subsidies. 
Proposition 2 
The impact of  regulation is indeterminate.  In particular,  regulation  may induce banks  to increase 
their risk exposure and  the likelihood  of failing  the audit.  Moreover,  the value of  the government 
subsidy per  dollar insured may increase. 
The proposition is proved by an example which illustrates that capital regulation can be coun- 
terproductive. Assume that the positive net present value factor, S(q), is 1 percent, that the charter 
value is 6 percent of the deposit base, and that the correlation between the risky bond and the loan 
portfolio is -0.75.  The instantaneous volatilities of the bond and loan portfolio are 8 and 5 percent, 
respectively. The regulatory reserve requirement parameter values for k and w are 3 and 8 percent, 
respectively. 
The optimal solution for the unconstrained problem occurs at (a*,  q*) = (0.0601,0.8353), with 
shareholder surplus, Z(a*,q*) = 0.06419 and the deposit subsidy per dollar insured, q(a*,q*) = 
0.00016.  For  the  constrained problem,  (a;i,qh)  = (0.08,1.0),  with  Z(a;t,q&) = 0.06412  and 
q(a;i,q;2)  = 0.00062.  These results  are summarized in  figure 3.  Notice  that regulation reduces 
shareholder wealth by  0.109 percent.  The value of  the government subsidy, however, grows 290 
percent.  This increase in the subsidy arises because the constrained  bank's leveraged  portfolio is 
riskier in spite of the additional capital that is required.  l2 
To illustrate the potential importance of  the minimum  capital requirement  constraint, k, on 
shareholder wealth and deposit insurance, we  consider a second example in which loans are fairly 
priced  (S(q) = 0); the charter value is 5 percent  of  the deposit base; the risky bond and the loan 
portfolios are uncorrelated; the instantaneous volatilities of  the bond and loan portfolio are 5 and 
10 percent, respectively; and w is 8 percent. 
l2  These results are similar to those of Koehn  and Santomero [I9801 and Gennotte and Pyle [1991], who find that 
for  insured  banks,  higher capital requirements  may increase the probability  of  bankruptcy.  However,  neither 
paper looks directly at how changes in capital regulation affect deposit insurers' risk exposure. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmThe optimal solution  for  the unconstrained  problem  is  (a*,  q*) = (0, I), with  Z(a*,  q*) = 
0.05901 and q(a*,  q*) = 0.03983.  For the constrained problem with k = 0, (a:,  q;2) = (0, O), with 
Z(a;2,q;2)  = 0.03997,  and q(a;2,qk) = 0.02034.  However, when  the minimum reserve of  k  = 3 
percent is added, the new constrained optimum moves to (ak,q:)  = (0.08, I), with Z(a:,q;2)  = 
0.03978, and q(a:,q;2)  = 0.0117.  The results are shown in figure 4. 
The example shows that the introduction of  minimum capital requirements reduces insurance 
costs. Indeed, in this example, the 3 percent minimum capital requirement reduced dollar insurance 
costs by almost one-half (from 2.03 to 1.17 percent) without lowering the shareholder surplus very 
much  (from 3.997  to 3.978 percent ).  This example illustrates  the importance of  the minimum 
capital constraint. Without it, a risk-based capital standard that considers only asset risk may result 
in the deposit insurance fund having alarge  risk exposure. However, the minimum capital constraint 
implicitly  taxes interest rate risk and therefore changes the relative  cost of  regulation associated 
with  asset risk.  Thus, when interest rate risk is present, the minimum  capital requirement may 
significantly reduce the exposure of  the deposit insurance fund. 
V.  Conclusion 
This article develops a two-factor model of  bank behavior under credit and interest rate risk.  Op- 
timal investment and financing decisions for the bank are explored in a regime where a government 
agency provides a flat-rate guarantee on all deposits.  Since the bank possesses a valuable charter 
that is eroded if  an audit reveals that the liquidation value of  the tangible assets does not exceed 
the deposit base, maximizing risk may not be optimal.  Nonetheless,  the government subsidy still 
provides an incentive for banks to bear more risk than they would if their deposits were uninsured. 
We investigate the moral hazard problem by explicitly identifying the bank's  optimal capital 
structure and investment decisions. The government agency can reduce moral hazard by regulating 
capital requirements. Within the framework of  our models, we  can explore the policy implications 
of such regulations. We show that without interest rate risk, diminishing charter regulations can be 
offset by an increasing capital constraint.  However, in an economy where interest rate risk exists, 
increasing capital regulation  may not produce the same results as increasing charter regulation. 
Indeed, we  note that increasing capital regulation  may induce some banks to bear more risk and 
hence may raise the cost of  the subsidy provided by the government  agency. 
We investigate optimal shareholders'  policies  and the impact of  their actions on the value of 
government-subsidized insurance.  We also explore the effect of interest rate risk and credit risk (and 
their correlation) on deposit insurance and look at how regulation has affected optimal shareholder 
policies.  In some cases, regulation increased banks' holdings in the loan portfolio, thus magnifying 
the value of  the government-subsidized put option. 
The model presented is a single period model in which the time remaining before an audit is 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmcertain.  It remains for future work  both to assess how  an uncertain audit date would  alter the 
findings and to generalize the class  of  functions used  to characterize the charter value  and the 
positive net present value from the loan portfolio. 
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Let 
df  (t,  TL) = pf  (t,  T~)dt  + of  (t,T~)dw(t) ;  VTL > t 
with f(0, T') given, a'f  (t, T') =  and pf  (t,T') curtailed so as to avoid riskless arbitrage 
opportunities. Further, let edt = E  [dw(t).dz(t)] denote the correlation between  the two stochastic 
disturbances.  Let  M(0) be the value of  a claim at date 0 that has terminal payouts at date TL, 
fully determined by the asset value S(TL) and the term structure at date TL. Then 
where the expectation is taken under the joint normal distribution of  the spot rate, r(TL), and the 
logarithm of the asset price, S(TL),  given by 
For a derivation of  the above martingale measures, see Ritchken  and Sankarasubramanian [1991]. 
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Theorem 
The fair  values of  the charter, the government  subsidy and the equity in the  bank are given by 
where 
and where 012  and 01  are as defined  in Appendix  1. 
Proof  The value of the portfolio at date T is 
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Now substituting for P(T,  s) and rearranging yields 
1 
V(T) = p  s+ln[P(o~T)I+ln[s(~)I  + (1 -  q)A*(T,  S)e-~(T,s)r(T)]  (A2.1) 
P(0,T) Lqe 
where  A*(T, s) =  e-~P2(T.s)&2(~)+~(~.s)f(0~s)a 
Under the martingale measure  (see Appendix 1) 
Now let 
Then substituting into (A2.1) we obtain 
Here a; is the variance of  the logarithmic returns on the loan portfolio over [O,T] and a; is the 
variance of the logarithmic returns of the bonds over [O,T], viewed from time 0.  (See Appendix 1.) 
Now the bank will pass the audit if V(T) > D(T) or equivalently if 
Equivalently, the bank passes the audit if 
or if 
where 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmThe probability of  solvency is therefore given by 
By symmetry, the probability of  solvency can also be expressed as 
The value of the claim on the charter at date T is 
C(T)  =  a)  D(T), if V(T)  > D(T) 
otherwise. 
Substituting for V(T)  and D(T),  we obtain 
C(T)  P(0,  T)  = 
otherwise. 
Computing expectations leads to 
The value of  the equity at date T is 
e(T) =  V(T)  -  D(T)  + C(T), if V(T)  > D(T) 
otherwise. 
Substituting for V(T),  D(T)  and C(T),  we obtain 
e(T)  P(0,T) =  qleUlz1  +  q2eu2Z2  -  (1 -  a)(1  -  g),  if  Zl  2 y1(Z2) 
otherwise. 
Hence, 
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2)  = {  0,  otherwise. 
Now note that 
Further, by symmetry, we  also obtain 
Substituting (A2.2), (A2.4) and (A2.5) into (A2.3) and rearranging then leads to the equity equa- 
tion.  The government  subsidy equation then follows by substituting for C(0) and e(0) into equa- 
tion (5). 
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Optimal Capital Structure and Investment Decisions for Different Charter Values 
Table 1 shows the optimal capital structure (a)  and investment decisions (q) for different charter values (g). The annual 
volatility of the loan portfolio, o,  is 10  percent. All loans are zero-net-present-value projects. If g = 0.0767, then any capital 
structure and investment decisions are optimal. The extreme-point nature of decisions arises because all projects are 
fairly priced. 
SOURCE:  Authors. 
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Optimal Capital Structure and I~ivestme~rt  Decisio~is  for Different Charter Values 
Table 2 shows the optimal capital structure (a)  and investment decisions (q) for different charter values (g). The annual 
volatilities of the risky loan and the default-free bond portfolio are 8 and 5 percent, respectively. The correlation is 0.4. All 
risky projects have zero net present value (that is, 6 = 0). Notice that with interest rate risk, interior solutions may be 
optimal. 
SOURCE:  Authors. 
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Optimal Investment and Financing Decisions as a Function of the Vola.tility of Bonds 
As the volatility of bonds, o ,  ,increases, the optimal portfolio decision involves allocating more funds to risky loans. Also, shareholders increase their 
capital,  a. In this example,  6 = 0.01, p = -0.5  and the charter value, g, is 0.06.  The sensitivity of optimal decisions to changes in the volatility of 
bonds is quite sensitive to these parameters. In the above diagram, o ,  is expressed in percentage form. 
SOURCE: Authors.. 
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Optimal Investment and Financing Decisions as a Function of the Loan Ret~~rn  and Bond Return Correlation 
Figure 2 shows the sensitivity of the optimal decisions, q*  and a*,  to changes in the correlation, p.  As p increases toward 1, the optimal q*  value 
drops to zero. At the same time, the optimal  a  * value converges to 0.047. The case parameters are the same as in figure 1. 
SOURCE:  Authors. 
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Restricted and Unrestricted Op'timal Capital Structure and Investment Decisiolis 
Figure 3 shows the unrestricted optimal solution and the restricted optimal solution in a -  q space. Notice that the unrestricted optimum violates 
the capital constraint. The restricted optimum has a higher capital requirement and a higher risky loan investment component. Notice also that the 
cost of deposit insurance under the constrained optimal solution, q;,  exceeds the unconstrained optimum value, q* .  In this example, 6(  q) is 1 
percent, the charter value is 6 percent of the deposit base, the correlation between the risky bond and the loan portfolio is -0.75,  and the volatilities 
of the bond and loan portfolio are 8 and 5 percent, respectively. The regulatory parameters are k=  3 percent and w=  8 percent. 
SOURCE:  Authors. 
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Restricted and Unrestricted Op'timal Capita.1  Structure and lnvest~iient  Decisio~is 
Figure 4 shows the unrestricted optimal solution and two restricted optimal solutions, the first for k = 0 and the second for k=  3 percent. In this 
example, the charter value is 5 percent of the deposit base, the risky bonds and loan portfolios are uncorrelated,  the instantaneous volatilities of the 
bond and loan portfolios are 5 and 10 percent, and w  is 8 percent. The example illustrates the sensitivity of the optimal capital and investment 
decisions to the capital constraint parameters, kand w. 
SOURCE:  Authors. 
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